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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Renee Danette Mondt appeals from the district court’s judgment of conviction
issued after Mondt pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug
paraphernalia, and driving without privileges. “[M]indful of the undisputed facts including
that Officer R[ichardson] ran Ms. Mondt’s driver’s license two days prior to the stop and
learned it was suspended, and was awaiting DMV results while the canine exterior vehicle
sniff occurred” (Appellant’s brief, p.9), Mondt argues that the district court erred in
denying her motion to suppress.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On February 18, 2017, Renee Danette Mondt drove past a stop sign without coming
to a complete stop. (Tr., p.9, Ls.2-22.) Officer Richardson with the Ada County Sheriff’s
Office saw the traffic violation and pulled Mondt over. (Tr., p.7, Ls.7-13, p.9, Ls.2-22.)
After Officer Richardson decided to stop Mondt, he recognized Mondt’s license plate from
an ongoing drug investigation involving Mondt and her boyfriend. (Tr., p.11, L.11 – p.12,
L.10, p.34, L.22 – p.35, L.10.) As part of Officer Richardson’s drug investigation and just
two days before he pulled Mondt over, Officer Richardson had run a check on Mondt’s
driving record that indicated Mondt’s driver’s license was suspended. (Tr., p.42, Ls.5-9.)
Although Officer Richardson did not know that it was Mondt who was driving the
vehicle when he decided to initiate a traffic stop, he “knew for sure once [he] made the
initial contact.” (Tr., p.12, L.23 – p.13, L.2.) Mondt provided Officer Richardson her
driver’s license and vehicle registration, but she did not have any current proof of
insurance. (Tr., p.22, Ls.18-23, p.25, Ls.13-15.) Officer Richardson asked Mondt whether
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there would be any reason her driver’s license was not current, and Mondt stated “ah, no,
not to my knowledge.” (Video 1 at 3:25 – 3:29.) “She responded with a questioning tone
to her voice.” (Tr., p.24, Ls.2-4.)
After Officer Richardson’s initial contact with Mondt, he walked back to his car.
(Video 1 at 3:30 – 3:55.) He attempted to check the status of Mondt’s driver’s license
using his computer. (Video 1 at 4:00 – 6:30; Tr., p.25, L.21 – p.26, L.1.) When he could
not “get[] any returns,” he used his radio to check Mondt’s driver’s license status with
dispatch. (Tr., p.25, L.21 – p.26, L.12; see Video 1 at 8:20 – 8:45.) A few minutes later,
dispatch informed Officer Richardson that Mondt had a local criminal record but that it
could not verify her driver’s license status at that time because “DMV is down.” (Video 1
at 10:53 – 11:10; Tr., p.41, Ls.17-24.)
While waiting for dispatch to determine the status of Mondt’s driver’s license,
Officer Richardson asked another officer to start writing Mondt a ticket for not having
proof of insurance and to listen for a response from dispatch. (Video 1 at 11:40 – 12:20.)
He then walked back to Mondt’s car, asked Mondt to get out of her car, and walked Mondt
back near the police car. (Video 1 at 12:21 – 13:15.) Officer Richardson informed Mondt
that he was going to run his drug dog around her vehicle. (Video 1 at 13:23 – 13:30.) He
also informed Mondt that he knew she had a suspended driver’s license from his
investigation into Mondt and her boyfriend and that he was waiting for dispatch to confirm
the suspension. (Video 1 at 13:52 – 14:30.) Mondt responded with surprise, asking why
her driver’s license had been suspended. (Id.)
Officer Richardson then used his drug dog to sniff around the outside of Mondt’s
vehicle. (Tr., p.46, Ls.10-15.) The dog alerted on the driver’s side of the vehicle. (Tr.,

2

p.46, Ls.16-18.) Officer Richardson had not received a response from dispatch or other
confirmation as to the status of Mondt’s driver’s license at the time the drug dog alerted.
(Tr., p.47, L.16 – p.48, L.15.)
Based on the drug dog’s alert, Officer Richardson conducted a search of Mondt’s
car. (Video 1 at 21:05 – 30:21.) He found suspected methamphetamine and paraphernalia
inside of a makeup bag in Mondt’s car. (Video 1 at 24:30 – 25:35.) While Officer
Richardson was searching Mondt’s car, the officers received confirmation on the computer
that Mondt’s driver’s license had been suspended on December 23, 2016, and would not
be reinstated until March 23, 2018. (Video 2 at 10:15 – 10:50.) Mondt was placed under
arrest. (Video 2 at 18:55 – 21:00.)
The state charged Mondt with possession of a controlled substance,
methamphetamine; possession of drug paraphernalia; and driving with a suspended license.
(R., pp.38-39.) Mondt moved to suppress the drug evidence found in her car on the basis
that the “Traffic Stop was impermissibly extended in violation of Ms. Mondt’s Fourth
Amendment Rights.” (R., p.66.) After a hearing on the motion to suppress (R., pp.13335), the district court denied Mondt’s motion because “there [was] no extension of the
stop” given that “the officer was unable to confirm that the defendant, Ms. Mondt, had
valid driving privileges until after he had already run a drug dog around her car.” (Tr.,
p.64, L.18 – p.65, L.4.)
Mondt entered a guilty plea on the condition that she could appeal the district
court’s decision on her suppression motion. (R., pp.136-37, 147-48.) The district court
sentenced Mondt to an aggregate fixed term of two years and an aggregate indeterminate
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term of three years of incarceration. (R., pp.157-60.) Mondt timely appealed. (R., pp.16770.)
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ISSUE
Mondt states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in denying Ms. Mondt’s Motion to Suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p.7.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Mondt failed to show that the district court erred when it denied Mondt’s
motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
Mondt Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Denied Her Motion To
Suppress
A.

Introduction
The district court properly denied Mondt’s motion to suppress because Officer

Richardson did not impermissibly extend the duration of the traffic stop. The Fourth
Amendment permits an officer who observes a traffic violation to stop the offending
vehicle and investigate the traffic violation. As part of the investigation, and consistent
with the Fourth Amendment, the officer can conduct ordinary inquiries related to the traffic
stop, such as verifying the status of the driver’s license. The Fourth Amendment also
tolerates the use of a drug dog during a traffic stop so long as it does not extend the duration
of the traffic stop.
Officer Richardson’s use of his drug dog did not extend the length of the traffic
stop. Mondt does not dispute that Officer Richardson conducted a lawful traffic stop. As
part of that stop, Officer Richardson conducted an ordinary inquiry as to the status of
Mondt’s driver’s license. While awaiting confirmation, Officer Richardson used his drug
dog to sniff Mondt’s vehicle. Because the drug dog alerted on Mondt’s vehicle prior to
Officer Richardson receiving confirmation that Mondt’s driver’s license had been
suspended, the use of the drug dog could not have extended the duration of the traffic stop.
Thus, Officer Richardson’s use of the drug dog did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews a district court’s order resolving a motion to suppress “using a

bifurcated standard of review.” State v. Huffaker, 160 Idaho 400, 404, 374 P.3d 563, 567
(2016). “This Court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly
6

erroneous, but may freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional principles in
light of those facts.” Id.
C.

Mondt Failed To Show That Officer Richardson Impermissibly Extended The
Traffic Stop
Officer Richardson did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

The Fourth

Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “The
seizure of a vehicle’s occupants in order to investigate a traffic violation is a ‘reasonable
seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment so long as the seizing officer had reasonable
suspicion that a violation occurred.” State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 608, 389 P.3d 150, 153
(2016). The seizure may last as long as “necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.”
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983); see Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct.
1609, 1614 (2015). The duration of the stop crosses the constitutional line only when it
“exceed[s] the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made.” Rodriguez,
135 S. Ct. at 1612; see Linze, 161 Idaho at 608, 389 P.3d at 153.
Regardless of the specific traffic infraction underlying the traffic stop, “an officer’s
mission includes ‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.’” Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct.
at 1615 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005)). “Typically such inquiries
involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants
against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Id.
These ordinary inquiries are always considered part of the purpose of a traffic stop because
they have a “close connection to roadway safety” and help “ensur[e] that vehicles on the
road are operated safely and responsibly.” Id.
In addition to allowing the completion of these “tasks tied to the traffic infraction,”
the Fourth Amendment “tolerate[s] certain unrelated investigations that d[o] not lengthen
7

the roadside detention.” Id. at 1614. These unrelated investigations include using a drug
dog to sniff for contraband. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409 (finding no violation of Fourth
Amendment where “the dog sniff was performed on the exterior of respondent’s car while
he was lawfully seized for a traffic violation”); Linze, 161 Idaho at 609 n.1, 389 P.3d at
154 n.1 (recognizing the U.S. Supreme Court “allow[s] for dog sniffs that do not add time
to the stop”); State v. Renteria, 163 Idaho 545, ___, 415 P.3d 954, 958 (Ct. App. 2018)
(holding patrol officer did not impermissibly extend a traffic stop by discussing potential
drug activity with canine officer because “he was still in his patrol car awaiting a response
from dispatch as to the validity of Renteria’s driving privileges”); State v. McGraw, 163
Idaho 736, ___, 418 P.3d 1245, 1249-50 (Ct. App. 2018) (holding drug dog sniff of car did
not impermissibly extend a traffic stop because it occurred while a second officer wrote
the traffic citation).
Officer Richardson’s use of a drug dog to sniff Mondt’s car did not violate the
Fourth Amendment because it did not extend the duration of the traffic stop. “[T]here was
no dispute that Officer Richardson conducted a lawful traffic stop . . . in response to Ms.
Mondt’s failure to fully stop at an intersection.” (Appellant’s brief, p.9.) Once Officer
Richardson stopped Mondt for a traffic violation, he could, consistent with the Fourth
Amendment, “check[] [Mondt’s] driver’s license,” Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615, by
“awaiting a response from dispatch as to the validity of [her] driving privileges,” Renteria,
163 Idaho at ___, 415 P.3d at 958. Mondt does not dispute that Officer Richardson used
the drug dog and the drug dog alerted prior to the time he received confirmation that
Mondt’s driving privileges had been suspended. (Appellant’s brief, p.9.) Because Officer
Richardson could, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, extend the traffic stop at least
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until he had confirmed Mondt’s driving privileges, his use of a drug dog prior to that time
could not possibly have lengthened the stop. See Renteria, 163 Idaho at ___, 415 P.3d at
958 (“Because dispatch still had not confirmed Renteria’s valid driving privileges . . ., the
conversation between Trooper Sproat and the canine officer did not unlawfully extend the
traffic stop.”).
Mondt erroneously argues that the purpose of the traffic stop terminated “once
Officer Richardson obtained her driver’s license, registration, and expired insurance, and
obtained confirmation that she was clear for warrants.” (Appellant’s brief, p.9.) Her
suggestion that Officer Richardson had to end the traffic stop prior to confirming the statuts
of Mondt’s driver’s license is directly contrary to decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court
and Idaho’s appellate courts holding that an officer conducting a traffic stop can, as part of
any traffic stop, verify the status of the driver’s driving privileges. See, e.g., Rodriguez,
135 S. Ct. at 1615; Renteria, 163 Idaho at ___, 415 P.3d at 958.
Even if an officer could not verify driving privileges as an “ordinary inquir[y]”
incident to all traffic stops, Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615, Officer Richardson had a
reasonable articulable suspicion that Mondt was violating Idaho’s traffic laws by driving
with a suspended license, which justified waiting for verification from dispatch in this case.
As the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized, during a traffic stop, a “new reasonable
suspicion” can “arise[] to justify the seizure[]” and generate a “new purpose” for the
investigative detention. Linze, 161 Idaho at 609, 389 P.3d at 154. The traffic stop can then
be extended, if necessary, “to effectuate th[at] purpose.” Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614.
Once Officer Richardson made contact with and recognized Mondt, he had a
reasonable articulable suspicion that she had been driving with a suspended license and
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could, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, extend the traffic stop until he completed
his investigation into that traffic violation. See id. Just two days before pulling Mondt
over, Officer Richardson “looked at her driver’s status” as part of an unrelated drug
investigation, and “her driver’s license status or records through DMV . . . indicated her
license was suspended.” (Tr., p.28, L.23 – p.29, L.11, p.38, Ls.11-14.) On the night Officer
Richardson stopped Mondt, he recognized Mondt’s license plate from the drug
investigation after he observed her failure to stop (Tr., p.34, L.22 – p.35, L.1), and he
recognized Mondt as the driver of the vehicle “once [he] made the initial contact” (Tr.,
p.12, L.23 – p.13, L.2).
Equipped with the knowledge that, just two days prior, Mondt had a suspended
license, Officer Richardson had a reasonable articulable suspicion that Mondt was driving
with a suspended license and could, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, “address the
traffic violation” by—at the very least—”determining whether to issue a traffic ticket.”
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614-15. 1 Officer Richardson could only make that determination
after verifying whether Mondt’s driving privileges were actually still suspended, and the
only way he could do that was to await confirmation from the DMV through dispatch or

1

Nothing about the interactions between Officer Richardson and Mondt dissipated the
reasonable articulable suspicion—quite the opposite. When Officer Richardson asked
Mondt whether there was any reason why her driver’s license would be suspended, “[s]he
responded with a questioning tone to her voice.” (Tr., p.24, Ls.2-4.) And when Officer
Richardson informed Mondt that he knew her driver’s license was suspended based on the
unrelated drug investigation, she responded with surprise, asking why her license had been
suspended. (Video 1 at 13:52 – 14:30.) If Mondt did not know her license had been
suspended, she could not have done anything to rectify the suspension in the past two days.
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his computer. 2 (Tr., p.43, Ls.11-15, p.44, L.24 – p.45, L.3.) Thus, Officer Richardson did
not impermissibly extend the length of the traffic stop by waiting for confirmation on the
status of Mondt’s driving privileges. And because Officer Richardson used his drug dog
and the drug dog alerted before Officer Richardson received confirmation that Mondt’s
driver’s license was suspended, his use of the drug dog could not have added time to the
duration of the traffic stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Rodriguez, 135
S. Ct. at 1616-17; Renteria, 163 Idaho at ___, 415 P.3d at 958.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of conviction entered
by the district court after Mondt pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance,
possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving without privileges.
DATED this 25th day of September, 2018.

/s/ Jeff Nye
JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General
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No evidence shows—and Mondt does not even allege—that Officer Richardson was not
diligent in pursuing confirmation of Mondt’s driving privileges. See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct.
at 1614 (observing that, “in determining the reasonable duration of a stop, ‘it [is]
appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued [the] investigation’”
(alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985))).
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